UK media regulation is chaotic

How content is regulated depends on who produces it. The rules vary enormously from Acts of Law set by the British Parliament, a regulator-imposed code of practice, to whatever the organisations decide amongst themselves.

The UK Parliament oversees Ofcom. If you’re a long-standing “broadcaster” you have a licence to operate and must abide by Ofcom’s Broadcast Code. If you’re a social media network Ofcom makes sure the Online Safety Act is followed.

But if you’re a newspaper or magazine you regulate yourselves via industry body IPSO and “the Editor’s code of practice”. Many digital-only outlets, blogs, and independent publishers have decided not to join IPSO and are completely unregulated.

Interactive: News Sources Over Time

Over the years Print as a source of news has died a death. Replacing it are News websites – now the most popular source. Both are mostly voluntarily regulated by the newspapers and magazine themselves. However, if you’re a broadcaster with a news website, then it’s Ofcom and the Broadcast Code.

After News websites, Social media is set to soon take over as the next most popular source for news – leaving TV and Radio to continue their long term decline. Social media news is regulated by Ofcom via the Online Safety Act.

And as for Podcasts? There’s no regulation of them. It’s worse for AI chatbots: depending on the content they’re serving it might be nobody, Ofcom, the Information Commissioner’s Office, the FCA or other bodies. Who knows?

Increasingly Ofcom looks irrelevant. Social media content is out of control, with the British Government proposing to simply block access for groups of users. News websites are self-regulated: we have no control over them. The rising popularity of new channels like Podcasts and AI chatbots either have no regulation or fragmented and ineffective approaches.

How well do others do it?

In the UK, with its chaotic and sometimes non-existent media regulation, its perhaps no surprise that concern about online misinformation is high and growing. A recent poll found that 77% say they are strongly concerned about online misinformation.

How does this compare with other European countries?

Interactive: Concern about Online Misinformation

In most other countries in Europe there is a much lower concern about misinformation online. Perhaps in these countries there is better media regulation. Let’s consider the largest country, Germany.

It’s hard not to see why Germans might trust their online media organisations more than those in the UK. A written constitution sets out freedom of opinion and freedom of the press for all. Each of Germany’s nine states regulate their one private and public media organisations. But delivering to local priorities and local accountability doesn’t stop there. The public-service broadcasters as regulated by a Council made of appointees from across society – no political placements here.

The Federal government works to ensure that all the state media authorities can work together, via a common inter-state media treaty agreed with the States. This is also the way in which relevant EU Directives are addressed.

Where does this leave Scotland?

There are no areas of the media available in Scotland where Scotland is involved in its regulation – all areas are out of Scotland’s hands: we get what we’re given and have no say.

Germany is a federal country. Each of the nine states regulate their own public and private media. In the UK, only Westminster is allowed this role, and this has always been dominated by just one nation: England.

I discuss in other articles how our single public-service broadcaster, the BBC, fails to serve Scotland and how the private media in Scotland is almost entirely owned outwith Scotland and not even based in Scotland.

There is clearly a lack of balance in how Scotland and our institutions are treated by the British media. Combined with the UK’s chaotic regulation of the media in Scotland it’s no surprise that there are high levels of concern. But not even our Government can do anything about this. For that we need all the powers and independence.

He says it will go “further than a blanket ban on social media” by blocking “harmful functions such as livestreaming” and “restrictions on these functionalities will also be on by default for under 16 and 17-year-olds to prevent a cliff-edge at 16. The government will also be looking in more detail at overnight curfews”.

YouTube and the BBC

Ofcom is the British government quango responsible for regulating both social media and legacy broadcasters like the BBC. It defines broadcasting as the transmission of television and radio programmes intended for the public. It maintains a Broadcasting Code that all licensed “broadcasters” are obliged to follow.

Despite broadcasting TV and radio to the public, YouTube is not classed by Ofcom as a broadcaster. It’s classed as a social media network.

Let’s compare how the Broadcasting Code specifically treats viewers under 18, the current YouTube child safety policy, and how the British government is proposing to treat YouTube.

Note that the Broadcasting Code applies to the BBC’s content whether it’s delivered on a linear channel (you can’t choose what to watch) or as video-on-demand (e.g. via iPlayer). It doesn’t apply if the BBC broadcasts content via YouTube.

Increasingly the BBC has broadcast content on YouTube. It recently agreed a strategic deal with YouTube to broadcast some new content there first.

Currently, YouTube applies more restrictive controls than the BBC on content aimed at children. Under the proposed British government controls all content for children will be unavailable via its general age ban on YouTube, but will continue on the BBC unchanged.

Content creation

The traditional argument against treating the BBC the same way as YouTube comes down to how content is created: the BBC commissions and controls all content creation and ensures compliance with the Broadcasting Code, whereas YouTube allows anyone to create content but controls how it is viewed in line with Ofcom’s enforcement of the British parliament’s Online Safety Act.

The Online Safety Act has general requirements for all social media networks to identify risks to children and take appropriate steps to protect them from some types of harmful content.

It’s worth noting that the Broadcasting Code’s requirements around content for children have been developed and increasingly enforced by Ofcom over a number of years. This has involved extensive discussion with the legacy broadcasters and the British government. It has avoided a “blanket ban”.

We have not seen the same extensive discussion and evolution of enforcement between Ofcom and the social media networks – instead the British government has reached quickly for an outright ban. This is surely an admission of their failure to regulate the networks.

Once banned, YouTube will be hugely more restrictive for children. The BBC will remain unchallenged. Rather than working with the social media networks to improve regulation, the choice is to implement a grossly unfair situation. Logically, if YouTube is banned from broadcasting video to children, then so should the BBC.

This ban seems even more illogical when you consider that the BBC has agreed to broadcast some new content first via YouTube – presumably this will be regulated by the Broadcasting Code under the terms of the BBC’s licence from Ofcom.

The bottom line

Parents may have happy memories of CBBC and forget limited other choices, but is that a reason to force this restriction on children today? After all, much right wing race hate and incitement to violence is promoted to adults via YouTube and other networks – what next, a ban for all age groups?

There will be no complete ban on social media in the UK. The fact is, children don’t vote – adults do. And pandering to parental prejudice is attractive. This isn’t about child safety, it’s about a refusal to grapple with weak regulation and a keenness from a weak PM for populist political distraction.

Here I describe how England-based parties pass themselves off as Scottish and register to field candidates in Scottish national and local elections. They register aliases and emblems to make them seem Scottish to voters. Sometimes these aren’t even registered.

A party’s name is one thing, but money and manpower tell the real story. Scottish parties like the SNP and Scottish Greens are financially self-sufficient: they raise their funds in Scotland, employ their staff in Scotland, and answer to their members in Scotland.

London-based parties operating north of the border work very differently.

Behind the Scottish branding lies a financial reality that most voters never see: one of subsidies from London HQ, donations funnelled from English donors, and staff resources quietly provided from afar. The numbers, publicly available from the Electoral Commission, are revealing – as I’ll demonstrate later.

Money flows south to north, but power flows only in the opposite direction. Whatever Scottish branding Labour and its London counterparts adopt, and however they structure their local accounting, the decisions that matter are made far from Scotland.

But most shocking is what’s revealed in strategy, policy, and priorities: I describe how all are set by bodies in which Scottish voices are a small minority. This isn’t an accident of geography; it’s baked into the formal governance structures of these parties. And it raises an uncomfortable question: when London headquarters and Scottish interests conflict, who wins?

Ultimately, Independence wouldn’t just change who governs Scotland, it would transform the entire political landscape. Every party would have to be genuinely Scottish: based here, funded here, and answerable to Scottish voters alone. The London parties would face an existential choice, new Scottish parties would emerge to fill the gaps, and for the first time, Scots would choose between truly sovereign political projects.

What’s in a name?

When is a Scottish political party not actually a Scottish political party? When it’s a London-based party using a registered alias. Ahead of the 2026 Scottish Parliament election, voters across Scotland were bombarded with leaflets and posters bearing names like “Scottish Labour,” “Scottish Liberal Democrats,” and “Scottish Conservatives”. Few will realise that none of these are real, independent parties. They are branding exercises; names adopted for electoral convenience by organisations whose headquarters, leadership, and loyalties lie firmly in London.

Here’s how the system works, all managed by Westminster’s quango, the Electoral Commission.

The “Labour Party” is based in London. It’s registered as a political party to stand candidates in England, Wales and Scotland. (A party can be based in England and choose to stand candidates in Scottish and Welsh national and local elections, but not in Irish elections.)

Whilst “Labour Party” is the party’s primary name, it can (and does) register many aliases. These registered “party descriptions” can be used for electoral purposes instead of the primary party name. The Labour Party has registered the maximum twelve. These include:

• “Welsh Labour”

• “Scottish Labour Party”

And as recently as March 2026:

• “Scottish Labour - A New First Minister”

• “Scottish Labour - New Leadership for Scotland”.

You can also register party emblems. The Labour Party has registered three.

These are all aliases and emblems for the “Labour Party” – not separate parties. Similarly the “Liberal Democrats” (registered name) have also registered the description “Scottish Liberal Democrats”; and the Tories (or “Conservative and Unionist Party” as they have registered their name) often call themselves “Scottish Conservatives” – which is neither a registered party name, nor a registered description.

Of the London parties, only Reform UK got it right – consistently campaigning only under the party name “Reform UK”. But even there they are starting to muddy the waters with a registered description of “Reform UK Scotland” and unregistered emblems like the above are starting to be used.

Follow the money

Scottish parties like The SNP and Scottish Greens raise and spend their money in Scotland. The staff who work for them are all based in Scotland, as are their members. Simple.

But parties based in England, like Labour, Reform and the Tories, manage their party finances in London. Parties like Labour make this easier by splitting its finances into different “accounting units”. These account for local income and spending, but ultimately HQ is responsible. HQ decides how much money passes between HQ and the accounting units.

All registered parties must provide a financial report to the Electoral Commission – both for its overall HQ income and spend, and for each of its accounting units. You can see all these party financial statements online.

Looking at the Labour Party: in total it had an income of about £90m. £39m of this came from donations – from people and organisations. £18m came from membership subscriptions.

Compare this with Labour in Scotland, where the largest single source of income is assistance from HQ in London. Similarly, some of Labour’s largest donors also give small amounts directly to Scotland.

In 2024 Labour in Scotland raised a paltry £72k in membership subscriptions – and this included donations from affiliated party organisations. The same year, Labour fundraising in Scotland amounted to £115k. Without that HQ subsidy and big donors in England it would be a much smaller force in Scotland.

But its not just money that HQ helps Labour in Scotland out with. The Labour Party declares having some 530 staff on average in 2024. In Scotland it only declares four – whilst acknowledging that “all other staff” involved in its operation are funded by HQ.

This remote support for Labour in Scotland is self-evident to every vote. Leaflets and their distribution; online advertising; the time of staff and members from other nations – all are provided to Labour in Scotland at no extra cost.

Made in London

Deliberately misleading names and cross-subsidy not available to Scottish parties is concerning enough. But these London parties pretend to have local control that just isn’t there. This goes to the heart of how they operate – is it in the interests of Scotland, or their party bosses in London? Because if it’s the bosses, then their priorities come from where the big donors and the big majority of their voters are – England.

The Labour Party is governed by a National Executive Committee. The Labour NEC is the ultimate governing and administrative body of the party. Its primary function is to set the party’s overarching strategic direction, and oversee national campaigns – including those in Scotland.

By “National” it means UK-wide. There are 40 reserved seats – only one is occupied by a member from Scotland. Currently this is not their leader in Scotland, but Jackie Baillie MSP.

How can Labour effectively incorporate strategic direction for Scotland into its “national” plans? What happens when they conflict?

Feeding into the Labour NEC is its National Policy Forum. This is the body responsible for overseeing the development and formulation of the party’s policy platform. Here there are only 10 reserved seats for Scotland out of its total of 166.

Who would believe that Labour’s policies fairly reflect Scottish priorities?

After Independence, Scotland’s Political Parties Would Have to Actually Be Scottish

When Scotland re-gains independence, the parties that we see here, and how they operate, will change radically. For a start they’ll all have to be based here! What state would be happy to allow foreign parties to stand candidates for election here, and fund their campaigns from abroad?

The benefits of independence on our political landscape are significant:

Democratic legitimacy

An independent Scotland would need to build genuinely sovereign political parties with Scottish governance, funding, and membership bases. This applies to Scottish parties like The SNP and The Scottish Greens now – but it would apply to ALL parties in this future.

Party restructuring

UK-wide parties would face a choice: establish fully independent Scottish parties, withdraw entirely, or attempt cross-border partnerships. Some might splinter or collapse without Westminster support.

There would be new parties created after independence – there might be a truly Scottish Labour Party, for example. These will fill the political holes left by the London parties and give a much richer political landscape for voters to choose from.

Funding shifts

London parties currently receive subsidies from England. They would lose that lifeline. Scottish branches would need to become financially self-sustaining, putting them on a level with existing Scottish parties.

New political landscape

Independence could trigger a realignment. Unionist parties lose their central purpose; new parties might emerge; existing ones would need to redefine their identity and values for a sovereign context.

Voter re-education

Scots accustomed to voting for “branch office” versions of UK parties would be choosing between genuinely distinct Scottish political projects for the first time.

Accountability gap closed

The core implication is that the disguise becomes impossible to maintain. Every party would have to be transparently Scottish: answerable to Scottish members, Scottish donors, and Scottish voters alone.

In short: independence wouldn’t just change the government, it would transform the entire political ecosystem that elections operate within.

Here I’ll use BBC Radio 4 as an example, though the same points could apply to any UK-wide BBC channel.

Radio 4’s service remit states it should be “a mixed speech service, offering in-depth news and current affairs and a wide range of other speech output including drama, readings, comedy, factual and magazine programmes.” It should “appeal to listeners seeking intelligent programmes in many genres which inform, educate and entertain,” and “domestic coverage should reflect the diversity of the UK.”

In its UK-wide services, the BBC prioritises programming based on likely audience reach, which means catering primarily to the largest audience: England. The Radio 4 service licence’s only commitment to reflecting the whole UK is that “each week the schedule will include programmes from one or more of the English regions, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland” — with no specification of how many.

Often the themes chosen for broadcast superficially appear to have UK-wide appeal. The problem lies in how they are addressed within programmes.

A concrete example: The Law Show

Radio 4’s The Law Show bills itself as “your guide to the law and the legal decisions that have a bearing on everyone in the UK.” Yet of its 208 episodes available online, only one deals primarily with Scottish Law (and that was broadcast back in 2011).

This matters because Scottish and English Law have been entirely separate jurisdictions since the Act of Union. Any legal topic affecting “everyone in the UK” will almost always require a distinct treatment for Scotland versus England and Wales.

To genuinely meet its service brief, the BBC would need to either discuss both Scottish and English Law, or address them in separate programming. For example this could cover English Law developments in UK-wide output (clearly flagged as not applicable to Scotland), while Scottish Law developments are covered by BBC Radio Scotland. Currently, no such programming exists on Radio Scotland.

A wider issue

This isn’t only about law. The same problem runs through every area where Scotland differs from the rest of the UK — including matters explicitly kept separate under the Union (law, education), powers held by the Scottish Parliament, and powers held by Westminster for England.

In practice, the BBC as a UK-wide public broadcaster examines most themes through an English lens, with no systematic effort to address those themes in Scotland-focused programming. It functions, in effect, as a broadcaster of content primarily relevant to an English audience.

The BBC promises to inform, educate and entertain everyone in the UK. But when Scottish and English law, education and governance have been separated for centuries, broadcasting the same content to everyone isn’t inclusion, it’s erasure. The corporation needs to reckon with what truly “reflecting the diversity of the UK” actually means.

A succession British governments, and the BBC Boards they have appointed, have failed to recognise and address this reality. Responsibility for Broadcasting in Scotland needs to belong to the Scottish Government.

The Scottish Parliament elections are over for another five years. When the Westminster bubble gives it any attention, it’s to look at us in the distance through the filter of tradition—and try to make sense on their terms. “The rise of Farage’s Reform”, “Labour’s fall”, “The Green effect”. It’s all about the London parties they’re familiar with, and depend on.

That would only be of academic interest if it weren’t that Scotland has no control over the broadcasters and other media filling our online and airways. That power currently sits in Westminster.

In 2025 only 2.9% of the broadcast mentions hitting Scotland and the UK included our most popular party—The SNP. And I would happily accept a bet that a large majority of those were negative mentions.

And as for all that other noise about the London parties so close to their hearts? Let’s inject some objectivity.

Well Labour has certainly declined by any measure—but this is hardly news in Scotland. It has been in constant decline since the Scottish Parliament was re-started in 1999. The bubble has noticed because it’s now also a thing in England.

What about Reform’s “rise”?

In England the bubble only experiences London parties. They also get to field candidates in Scotland, but here they come up against Scottish parties as well. And they are consistently less popular.

Labour may have been in constant decline, but the Tories never succeeded. And Farage’s Reform? They’re down there with the others.

Incidentally, that’s the Scottish Parliament, but what about Scotland’s councils? Currently, 43% of our councillors are SNP — by far the largest group. Contrast this with England where Labour and the Tories are neck and neck on only 26%. This is the same as Plaid Cymru in Wales.

The Scottish Parliament elections are split in two: one vote based on FPTP (first past the post) constituencies just like Westminster, and one based on PR (proportional representation) regional lists. If you do well in the constituencies you get deliberately penalised in the list. Otherwise, the SNP would win about 90% of the seats, and that’s just not fair, is it.

In the constituencies you vote for a person. In the list it’s just a party, and the party decides the people who get the seats.

Farage’s Reform won not a single constituency seat. In fact his candidates were so unpopular that they came third or worse in 83% of Scotland’s seats. Safe to say that they were not the most attractive bunch. Cult Farage only won seats by promoting his party brand, not those candidates. As my local Reform candidate said on ITV News: “I don’t know if I necessarily believe in Climate Change, we always have climate”.

Belatedly, the bubble has been challenged to comment on the actual result: for the fifth time, the SNP proved overwhelmingly popular. And what did they come up with?

SNP vote share is down! They’re no longer as popular! Nobody wants independence anyway! It’s all about cost of living and the NHS!

Yes, SNP vote share is down, but it remains much higher than Labour’s at the last Westminster election. In fact, it was higher than Labour’s at any election in the last twenty years (excluding the first Corbyn one, but they don’t talk about that). Must try harder.

So, just like the bubble, we’ve been avoiding the elephant in the room: independence. This is not an “issue” like the cost of living or the NHS. It’s something that over-arches all priorities, promising to help Scotland better address them all. So of course we want reduced cost of living, a better performing NHS etc. but we can simultaneously want those things now, whilst aiming for a place where we can more thoroughly address them. And that place is called a Scotland, independent once again, and back in the centre of Europe as part of the EU.

This should be self-evident even to the bubble: The Scottish Parliament has been mostly full of pro-independence MSPs for the last 25 years. And it has never been a bigger number.

Take the case of millionaire banker Malcolm Offord, Baron Offord of Garvel.

A merchant banker and private equity partner, he amassed significant riches in the City of London. Politically, he joined Tory leader Iain Duncan Smith’s right-wing think tank the “Centre for Social Justice”. As part of the Independence “No” campaign he was a director of “Vote No Borders” (from which he was forced to withdraw due to false advertising).

More recently Offord has had lots of links with Reform Scotland, a pro-Union Edinburgh based think-tank.

In the 2021 Scottish Government elections he stood as a Tory list candidate and failed to be selected for a seat.

However his ambition was unthwarted. Shortly afterwards he was made a life peer by PM Boris Johnson, and then immediately appointed to Government anyway, in the role of “Under-Secretary of State for Scotland”.

Despite his government position Offord was happy to vote on laws affecting England: he voted against the Renters’ Rights Bill. He’s also voted against House of Lords reform, removing hereditary peers, against levelling-up and regeneration, and against tightening up economic crime and improving corporate transparency.

He had donated at least £150,000 to the Tory party and recorded his country of residence as England. Following Labour’s rise to the British government Offord was appointed as Shadow Minister (Energy Security and Net Zero).

But Offord craves public appreciation of his many obvious talents – talents he alone appreciates, unfortunately. He’s now back for yet another go at getting political power. This time it in Scotland’s Parliament. Apparently being elected, rather than appointed, gives him more personal legitimacy.

The easiest way to become a member of the Scottish Parliament is to get high up the list for the PR part of the Parliament’s elections. People vote for a party, and those at the top of the list are given a seat. Your personal popularity (or lack of it, in this case) has little impact.

As so many Tories before him have done, Offord saw the writing on the wall for the Conservatives. He jumped ship to Farage’s Reform UK. Farage likes a peer – he’d love to be one himself – Offord’s offer to lead Farage’s party in Scotland was readily accepted. We don’t know if he has made any donations.

In 2021 Offord was only placed fifth by the Tories on the Lothian Region list. They won three list seats. In 2026 we can safely assume that Offord will place himself top of the list.

Offord has immediately embraced the opportunity to demonstrate his right-wing hypocrisy – bragging about his new Party as a party of the people, whilst proposing to cut the welfare and public services those people depend on.

Offord is proud to proclaim that 80% of Farage’s candidates for the Scottish Parliament elections have never been elected politicians before. Perhaps Reform UK’s choice for leader in Scotland is a good fit after all.

Of course, what looks convincing is often not true – ask any con man. With AIs this is particularly true for narrow subject areas. Ask then anything about Scottish Government policy, for example, and you’ll find only a handful of referenced sources – many with strong political bias.

Using an AI can easily generate political propaganda, dressed up as fact.

But don’t give up! AIs are still useful in other ways. For example, tidying up your text and checking grammar (you can probably tell I didn’t use one in writing this article). They can also re-write text in different ways – e.g. pulling out key points or making a summary more engaging. You could probably do this yourself, but its just quicker with an AI to help.

It occurred to me that I could do the same thing with things other people had written.

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I have a particular bug bear about British media in Scotland – virtually all are based in England and are forever misrepresenting what our Scottish Government and Scottish political parties do. The slant is always pro-unionist, pro-Westminster. They’re always fast to highlight apparent issues (with no balanced comparison with e.g. England) and never highlight Scottish success. This even extends to the BBC in Scotland, which accepts more factual errors than all other areas of the BBC combined.

What if AI could help address this bias? I thought I’d try an experiment.

Removing anti-Scottish bias from The Times

Back in the day, The Times used to be a respected newspaper. It checked facts and presented balanced views. Nowadays it sits squarely to the right of the political spectrum. And for this reason, it is firmly against the progressive policies favoured by Scottish Governments and Parties.

It published a long article recently about the up-coming Scottish Government budget, entitled “SNP seeks third decade in power with cost of living budget”. Apparently the SNP is reported to be announcing “a package to fix the NHS and support family budgets as the party fights to stay in control at Holyrood”.

Whilst Scotland was hit by COVID just like every other country, recovery of its health service is driven primarily by the money passed back to it by Westminster – over which it has no control. Despite this, The SNP has delivered better outcomes by virtually any measure compared to the British Government that runs the NHS in England. The SNP has also delivered some uniquely Scottish measures to support families, reducing child poverty to much lower levels than are seen in England. But I digress. Naturally The Times makes no reference to this.

I won’t summarise all the bias in The Times’ article - it would be a boringly long excercise. Instead I’ll show you what happened when I asked an AI (Microsoft’s Copilot in this case) to summarise it in a neutral way, removing anything subjective. Here’s the result:

Scottish Government Pre-Election Budget

First are the key highlights with subjectivity and political commentary removed, followed by a longer “neutral” narrative. A comparison of the original with this “cleaned up” version highlights clearly exactly how much of The Times’ text was really comment rather than reporting.

Pre-election Budget Goals

• Address cost of living and improve public services.

• Strengthen NHS recovery and support family budgets.

Key Measures Expected

• Expand free childcare to remove delays in access.

• Increase funding for social care to reduce hospital discharge delays.

• Provide additional support for colleges to boost skills and economic growth.

• Offer relief for businesses facing significant business rate increases.

Tax and Fiscal Adjustments

• Possible changes to income tax anomaly affecting middle-income earners.

• Consideration of council tax cap to prevent large increases.

Anti-Poverty Initiatives

• Allocate £155 million windfall to measures such as childcare and school meal expansion.

Other Planned Actions

• Sports development policies linked to recent international events.

• Continued focus on balancing economic growth with family support.

Political Context

• Labour will abstain on the budget vote, ensuring passage without major negotiations.

• Government still engaging with other parties for additional support.

The Scottish Government is preparing a pre-election budget aimed at addressing the cost of living and improving public services. Key measures expected include expanded free childcare to eliminate delays in access, increased funding for social care to reduce hospital discharge delays, and support for the college sector to enhance skills and economic growth. Additional relief for businesses is anticipated to offset significant business rate increases following a revaluation.

The budget may also address the income tax anomaly affecting middle-income earners and consider adjustments to council tax, potentially introducing a cap on increases. Anti-poverty initiatives will benefit from a £155 million windfall, with discussions on how best to allocate these funds, including potential enhancements to childcare and school meal provisions.

Sports development policies are planned to build on Scotland’s recent international participation, and measures to strengthen the NHS are a priority. While independent forecasts indicate fiscal challenges ahead, short-term pressures have been eased by improved tax and social security revenues and a one-off Treasury boost.

Labour has announced it will abstain on the budget vote, ensuring its passage without the usual negotiations, though the government continues to seek support from other parties. The overall strategy aims to balance economic growth, family support, and public service improvements while managing long-term financial sustainability.

What next?

I’d like an app that takes British news sources and automates this de-politicisation for me. Of course, Scotland could just regulate its media itself. But for that, we need independence.

As a way to predict power in Westminster that’s fine. But these polls are quoted for many other reasons – and this is where the problems start. Outside of Westminster election campaigns they’re regularly used as general indicators of current political party and British government popularity.

What’s wrong with GB-wide polls?

It’s exclusionary. It hides the politics of all nations except England. And when these politics reflect widely differing voter priorities, that’s an issue. It means that British political commentators and the parties that dominate Westminster naturally bias towards England.

How big an issue is this? Let’s look at how much each nation contributes to each party’s popularity in that “whole GB” result. It’s clear that five parties essentially represent England. Two represent Scotland, and one Wales.

But hold on – the British media and English parties regularly present this as the view of the entire country! They mostly only talk about “the main parties” – meaning those that represent England. There is more.

Pollsters like YouGov routinely present “Green party” popularity across GB as though this were one party. English parties and the media present this as though it were the popularity of the Green Party of England Wales – ignoring the fact that it also includes a share attributable to the Scottish Greens. It might be a small share, but its not insignificant. At the moment it adds about 1% to the “Green” vote share.

All of this wouldn’t be a big concern if the English parties only stood candidates for election in England. But they don’t. Again, this wouldn’t be a concern if the English parties were equally popular in other nations as they are in England. But they aren’t.

In fact if we look at Scotland and Wales, most (Wales) or all (Scotland) of the English are distinctly unpopular! Compare this with England, which only has English parties.

What needs to change?

Unless it’s a run-up to an actual Westminster election, pollsters and those who use them should take a national view of politics. Yes, this is more wordy. It’s more difficult to get that one-sentence “hook” for online attractiveness. And yes, it needs more thought – and understanding – about the politics of the UK beyond the border of England. But those are all good things, surely?

Something like this would be an improvement:

And in reality, who are the UK’s main national political leaders? Well they’re not just the ones in England, that’s for certain.

The cat is out of the bag: across the United Kingdom, there’s a deep and growing rejection of the English Establishment’s grip on Westminster. Voters in all nations are no longer willing to be gaslit.

So where do we go from here?

What happened to Labour’s “UK Reset”?

Buried towards end of Labour’s Westminster election manifesto from 2024 Labour got around to the UK nations that aren’t England. It promised to “reset the UK government’s relationship with devolved governments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland“.

Before his party won that election and he was appointed as British PM, Starmer made lots of promises:

• “UK trade negotiators will work with devolved governments”

• “Labour will restore decision-making over the allocation of structural funds to the representatives of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland”

• “In Scotland we will protect and respect devolution and reset relations between governments.”

As part of the “reset” Starmer promised to strengthen The Sewel Convention. This convention trusts that the British Parliament will not legislate on matters within the powers of Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland without their consent. It was acknowledged formally in the 2016 Scotland Act.

This Convention is no longer honoured. In recent times the biggest breach of The Sewel Convention was the UK’s Brexit agreement with the EU, which at every stage the Scottish Government refused to give consent. Labour has refused to consider any material change to this agreement, or to the UK Internal Markets Act created by Westminster on the back of this agreement – which most consider as a power grab by Westminster undermining the basis for devolution.

In reality Labour doesn’t consult – in fact there’s no evidence that Labour goes beyond occasional basic communication. Which is all the Tories managed to achieve.

Do you remember Labour’s much-publicised launch of the Council of the Nations and Regions? Since its inaugural meeting in 2024, there’s been little to show for it. Imposed without meaningful consultation with the devolved governments, the Council failed to build on the collaborative groundwork laid by Westminster’s earlier Review of Intergovernmental Relations—an effort that had, notably, involved all nations and administrations. The silence since then speaks volumes.

Labour, of course, wasn’t involved in that earlier Review—they weren’t in government at the time. Instead, they turned to their trusted Scot, Gordon Brown, to lead yet another Commission on the UK’s future, this time for the Labour Party itself. Crucially, no national governments were consulted, and none endorsed its findings. Yet Labour used it as the blueprint for its new Council.

Labour had grand proposals for England, as well as the other nations. It promised a “devolution revolution” with six areas of England forming a “Devolution Priority Programme”:

(click for dynamic chart)

There’s no denying that England’s local democratic structure is a tangled mess. From Regional Combined Authorities and the Greater London Authority to County and District Councils, Metropolitan and London Boroughs, Unitary Councils, and Metro Mayors—every layer ultimately answers to Westminster.

From Westminster’s point of view, managing this patchwork of single- and two-tier councils is a headache. It’s no surprise Labour wants to simplify it. But their plan would collapse two or three levels of local government into just one: the large ‘devolution areas’ now being formed as Combined Authorities.

The problem? Scale. Today, a District Council—the smallest authority with real power—represents around 170,000 people. That’s already substantial. But under Labour’s reforms, a Combined Authority will represent an average of over 430,000 citizens, with some covering far more. How much attention can an individual expect? More importantly, how connected will elected members be to local priorities—or even care about them?

The reality is that Labour’s reform will push elected representatives further away from the communities they serve. So much for ‘local’ democracy.

The Labour Fail

Just over a year ago, Labour swept into power with a landslide majority, riding on a simple message: ‘We’re not the Tories.’ But fast forward to today, and across all nations, Labour has lost between 40–50% of its support.

Both Labour and the Conservatives have seen sharp declines, while other parties have surged. In England, Reform has gained ground; in Scotland, the SNP leads by a wide margin. In Wales, Plaid Cymru and Reform Ltd are battling for first place, with the Conservatives in third—and Labour, the party of government, trailing in a weak fourth.

So how did Labour fall so far, so fast, in the eyes of the public?

(click for dynamic chart)

Progressives find their home

If you look at vote share – rather than party seats or government control – the picture is pretty similar across Western Europe: a little less than a half of voters will favour right wing parties; a majority will favour progressive parties. Although historically Scotland is a little different…

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In virtually all countries this is fine. It means that progressive policies will be a greater guarantee of power, as reflected by the preferences of most voters. With Proportional Representation this doesn’t mean that right wing parties don’t get a seat at the table – just that they don’t usually dominate the coalition discussions. Governments mostly pursue progressive policies: taxes and benefits are high; inequality is reduced.

The UK is different. With one of the least democratic systems, Westminster’s First Past The Post mostly never results in a British Government that reflects the preferences of most voters. When it does, it is at exceptional moments – like when there’s a world war or extreme economic depression.

(click for dynamic chart)

In 2024 Labour played the Westminster system to perfection. Despite a record low vote share, it achieved a record high number of seats. It identified England as the target for this – and in particular the need to appeal to right wing voters (and assume their traditional base wouldn’t desert them). It’s continued this trend in power – which is fine, except the Tories are now out of power and there’s only Labour to blame.

Disillusionment and Fragmentation

Enter Reform Ltd, claiming the right-wing high ground and attracting former Tory voters now left without a political home.

So what has Labour done in response? Rather than reaching out to progressive voters—especially in Scotland, where it might have made sense—it has doubled down on the rightward shift led by Starmer and his ‘Blue Labour’ clique. That faction has steered the party in a direction strikingly similar to the one voters just rejected.

And for right-wing voters, why settle for a watered-down version when Reform Ltd offers the full package? The answer is simple: they don’t. Labour’s current trajectory appears not only misguided but increasingly self-defeating. At this rate, it’s not unreasonable to imagine Nigel Farage and Reform forming the next Westminster government in 2029.

As Reform rises and Labour falters, where do disillusioned progressive voters turn? Increasingly, the answer depends on the nation. In Scotland, it’s the SNP and Scottish Greens. In Wales, Plaid Cymru and the Green Party of England and Wales are gaining ground. And in England, the Green Party of England and Wales stands as the only meaningful progressive alternative.

In both Scotland and Wales, progressive politics is deeply intertwined with the independence debate. Whether the priority is reforming the NHS, boosting the economy, tackling inequality, or improving immigration policy, the overarching vision of independence—and rejoining the EU—is increasingly seen as a more effective path than anything Westminster has to offer.

It’s no surprise, then, that the Green Party of England & Wales has voiced support for the right of Scotland and Wales to choose their own future. Yet its electoral success has been almost entirely in England—where, notably, it has a real chance of overtaking Labour as the main progressive alternative to Reform. In contrast, its support in Wales has declined since 2024.

This shift highlights the need to view politics through a nation-by-nation lens, especially as progressive voters seek meaningful representation beyond Westminster’s reach.

Britain is Broken

One plausible future could see Reform Ltd forming a Westminster government, with the Green Party as the main opposition; independence movements gaining momentum in Scotland and Wales; and Irish reunification becoming a reality. For Scotland and Northern Ireland, all roads may well lead back to the EU.

In this scenario, England itself would be forced to confront long-overdue reform, as the grip of the English Establishment finally slips—some might say, not before time. Legacy structures like first-past-the-post and the unelected House of Lords would likely be replaced by proportional representation and a truly representative second chamber. But first, the country would need to endure a Reform-led term in office. That alone could be enough to sharpen national focus.

The old pan-British ‘unionist’ parties would increasingly appear outdated. The Green Party of England and Wales is already setting a new precedent—functioning largely as an English party, reflecting English priorities. And rightly so: party popularity is beginning to mirror national concerns.

Alternatively, a bold leader in Westminster could take the initiative, introduce a federal structure to address the independence pressures, and lead a genuine reform of UK democracy.

So, which path seems more likely to you?

Most of that dividend results from Scotland keeping all its wealth in areas like revenues from food and drink, oil and gas – and energy. At present all that heads South and Westminster only returns a small portion.

What might this Independence Dividend be spent on? What would it cost to build the Wellbeing Economy that directs growth at people and the planet – rather than their exploitation. Here are some ideas. Even with all these investments and their transformative outcomes, barely half of the dividend gets spent. What would you spend the rest on?

A Wellbeing Economy

A Wellbeing Economy is the SNP Scottish Government’s vision for Scotland. It prioritises using growth to invest in people, and protecting the planet. This is in contrast with successive British Governments who have instead prioritised growing the economy by exploiting people and the planet – whilst presiding over ever increasing inequality.

In the latest figures from the World Inequality Database someone in the UK in the bottom 50% of income receives, on average, a ninth of the income of someone in the top 10%. This contrasts with The Netherlands at a sixth. This means someone in the bottom 50% of incomes in The Netherlands is getting, on average, a third higher income than their equivalent in the UK.

(click for dynamic link)

Investing in people means prioritising areas such as improved health outcomes and reducing inequality. Protecting the planet means priorities such as renewable energy, public and active transport.

Let’s pick some big impact areas and see what they’d cost. I’ve identified three areas for immediate potential investment in a newly independent Scotland:

• Inequality

• Health

• Transport.

Currently the Scottish Government must spend to mitigate British Government policies that fight against a Wellbeing Economy. After independence, with this restraint removed, the choices will be bigger – as will be the benefits.

Let’s look at the costs I’ve estimated for some headline initiatives in these areas.

(click for dynamic chart)

Even having addressed all the areas discussed below, only about half the dividend will have been spent. What else should be a priority?

Addressing inequality

Scotland’s UK legacy has led to one of the highest levels of inequality in Western Europe. Despite the SNP Scottish Government’s work to mitigate the effects of this – for example by reducing Child Poverty well below the level in England – there is still much that can’t be afforded in the current UK.

Let’s look at some of the improvements that could be made:

Double the State Pension

Despite the UK’s wealth, the UK State Pension is much lower than many other countries. In fact it has one of the highest per-capita GDPs in Europe, but a State Pension that barely covers the average cost of living. Whilst Luxembourg stands out at the top, Spain and Norway both sit at about twice the level of UK State Pension (as compared to the average cost of living in those countries).

Let’s double State Pension. Scotland would then sit just above Spain and Norway, in 2^nd place. What would this cost? According to the UK DWP spending on pensions for people in Scotland in 2024/25 cost £246m. Doubling it would cost a further £246m.

(click for dynamic chart)

Reduce Child Poverty

Child poverty in Scotland is well below that in England, thanks to the SNP Scottish Government’s decisions to mitigate some of the worse policies of British governments. But compared to Scandinavian countries, The Netherlands, Belgium – and even Slovenia – it is still high.

(click for dynamic chart)

Let’s reduce Child Poverty to Scandinavian levels – 15% instead of 22%. This compares with the worst level in Europe (31% - achieved in England).

We’ll do this by following the priorities set out by the Child Poverty Action Group, where the SNP Scottish Government hasn’t already adopted its strategy. This means:

Building enough new social housing to remove all households from temporary accommodation. According to Shelter this is currently some 17,000 housing units. This will cost £2.8bn – although whether they could all be built in one year is debateable!

Introducing a Minimum Income Guarantee. Similar in concept to a universal basic income, this would ensure that no one falls below an agreed income level set to allow everyone to live a dignified quality of life, offering financial security and unlocking opportunities for all.

Whilst a minimum income guarantee requires a large investment – estimated at about £270m/yr – in reality its impact on child poverty is likely to save a lot of money too.

Health

Undoubtedly the largest impact of the austerity forced on Scotland by successive British governments has been on our NHS and care services. The level of satisfaction has fallen significantly during this austerity period – particularly in other parts of UK.

(click for dynamic chart)

This declining satisfaction can be matched to British Government cuts to NHS funding. And as that spend is set to barely increase in future years, the situation isn’t going to improve. The Nuffield Trust has looked at party manifesto commitments from the Westminster 2024 election and compared these with the actual funding required to implement the NHS’ workforce plan. The outlook is grim.

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The British Medical Association (the BMA) has looked at other aspects of NHS funding as well – like the cost of maintaining health infrastructure and removing the backlog of elective care and outpatient appointments. Together I estimate that Scotland’s NHS needs some £861m/yr increase, as well as some £1.4bn of one-off investment. Let’s put it all in the first year and get the benefits of independence as quickly as possible.

Now let’s consider that other major area of health that isn’t the NHS – care services in the community. The SNP Scottish Government have developed a National Care Service strategy to address this. First introduced to the Scottish Parliament in 2022, it has the intention of reforming how social care, social work and community health services are delivered in Scotland. It has been described as the most significant reform to public services since the creation of the NHS.

COSLA – the organisation that represents Scotland’s local authorities (most of which are controlled by unionist parties) has been very critical of the Scottish Government’s plan. This is primarily because of the cost. Let’s go with COSLA’s worst case estimate of £1.5bn/year. No one else supports this worst case, but let’s use it anyway.

Public transport

The Scottish Greens have developed a comprehensive (and costly) transport strategy. Whilst its primary aim is to reduce emissions, it is designed to build safer communities by prioritising public transport, cycling, walking, and supporting the rapid replacement of fossil fuel vehicles.

At the centre of this strategy is a “Rail for All” investment programme designed to upgrade Scotland’s railways to build a modern, zero carbon network that is affordable and accessible to all. This is a 20yr investment of £22bn.

It will see all communities of more than 5,000 people connected to the national rail network – restoring and extending lines throughout Scotland that were probably last used in the 1950’s.

Other highlights include:

• Re-integrating ScotRail and Network Rail (Scotland) into one publicly-owned company

• A Firth of Forth Tunnel to transform east coast transport

• Increasing capacity on the Highland Main Line

• Reducing journey times on the Aberdeen-Inverness and West Highland lines

• Introducing “TramTrains” in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Dundee to quickly improve public transport provision.

And finally - the EU

I discuss here how an independent Scotland could reasonably expect to join the EU within seven years. Even during the application process this would open up Scotland’s access to many EU social funding programmes. These could well complement or replace elements of government investment outlined above. But what’s very clear is that the independence dividend will benefit everyone.

Let’s look at some key performance measures. These are the ones the British media and politicians likes to quote most frequently:

• A&E Waiting Times

• Cancer Mortality

• GP numbers.

It’s worth noting that whilst England, and to a lesser extent Wales, are amongst the most densely populated nations in Europe: Scotland is one of the least populated. Providing effective healthcare in rural areas is a particular challenge.

At the end I look at how satisfied people say they are with local health services. Its fare to say that this satisfaction reflects the results from these key performance indicators – but, at least in Scotland, does not reflect what the British media tells us.

(click for dynamic chart)

Tldr; if you just want the answer, and not the detail, it’s The SNP in Scotland. I live in the Borders of Scotland. So as well as each nation’s performance I’ve also included performance for my local area.

My area is semi-rural/rural and one of the less affluent areas of Scotland. It’s variously shown here as “MSTL” (Midlothian South, Tweeddale, and Lauderdale), Scottish Borders, and Midlothian – depending on the data source.

A&E Waiting Times

The most frequently quoted measure of A&E performance is the proportion of people attending A&E who are dealt with within 4 hours. This chart compares the pre-COVID 2020 performance of each nation with the latest data from March 2025.

(click for dynamic chart)

It’s clear that NHS Scotland performance remained significantly better than that of the NHS in England or Wales, both before and after COVID. In Scotland the NHS is organised around local Health Boards: my local ones are NHS Lothian and NHS Borders.

Interestingly, it was this Health Board structure that particularly came into its own during COVID. Rather than Westminster’s hugely costly and somewhat less effective centrally-directed test and trace approach, in Scotland the SNP devolved responsibility to each Health Board. These Health Boards were already experienced in vaccine work and delivered a more successful approach at vastly lower cost than in England (and without that corrupt “VIP Lane”).

But I digress.

If we look at the more detailed trends in A&E performance its clear that the NHS in SNP Scotland has consistently performed better than the NHS in Labour Wales. However the dramatic drop in England’s performance, compared to Scotland, coincides with the early years of the Lib Dem/Tory reign in Westminster – and its introduction of austerity measures.

Funding for the NHS flatlined.

For those who understand Scottish Government funding, you’ll be aware that Westminster decides what proportion of the public revenues it collects from Scotland get returned to Scotland. And this can be significantly impacted by what priorities on spending it is applying in England.

So when Westminster decided to flat-line NHS spending in England, this hit Scottish (and Wesh) budgets too. Unlike Westminster, Scotland has no sovereign ability to create money for investment – so the Scottish Government is obliged to work within the budget set by Westminster.

How then did Scotland maintain NHS performance, whilst England and Wales performance plummeted? The Scottish Government did not apply all those Tory “reforms” that NHS England suffered. It didn’t waste money on costly privatisations, large scale ideologically driven reorganisation, or pointless wars with NHS staff. It got on with refining an already working model, whilst applying progressive best practices learnt from across Europe.

(click for dynamic chart)

Cancer Mortality

Cancer is a major cause of premature death in Great Britain, particularly for adults, though it is not the leading cause of death overall, which is dementia. There are many different types of cancer – and many can be addressed successfully or avoided completely if we concentrate on healthy lifestyles and early detection.

In Scotland there has been much work done on this avoidance and early detection. The result is that mortality rates in Scotland have been falling much more quickly than in England and Wales. However in my rural area – the Scottish Borders – Labour has actually performed better when comparing this with the Welsh national norm.

This partial good news needs to be tempered though. If we compare a like-for-like rural area of Wales like that covered by the Hywel Dda Health Board, then Labour is delivering a performance level more comparable to that in England.

(click for dynamic chart)

The latest year that data is available from all nations is 2020. Cancers affect different ages and sexes differently, so a “European age-standardisation” method is applied to allow us to compare all cancers across the full population.

GP Numbers

Westminster has introduced a somewhat unpopular new “GP Contract”. This dictates how GPs are paid by the NHS – they effectively operate as private contractors to the NHS. This is a relic of how the NHS was originally set up after WWII. It was felt at the time that bringing GPs fully into the NHS was a step too far (code for “they made a lot of noise against it”). As a result GP relationships with the NHS are complicated.

In Scotland much work has been to done to bring GPs into the NHS model, despite this contractual complication – and as a result the “GP Contract” in Scotland is quite different to the one in England. There is much more focus on treating the GP as a key part of an integrated community health team that includes hospitals and other community health care groups.

The latest move in this direction is the construction in Scotland of one-stop community health hubs such as that newly opened in Parkhead including GPs and other health and community professionals under one roof. Its one outcome that typifies the SNP’s holistic Wellbeing Economy approach.

These differing approaches can be seen in how GPs have been trained and retained by the different NHS organisations. Scotland has significantly more GPs in relation to its population size than England. Even Wales is more successful in this respect.

(click for dynamic chart)

Looking at the long term trend, it’s clear that Westminster has failed to address GP numbers for many years.

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Satisfaction

This comparison looks at how satisfied people say they are with their local health services. It’s no surprise that, across all nations, people are less satisfied now. This drop coincides with the long-term enforcement of Westminster austerity and flat-line spending on the NHS that came with it. It is accelerated by the aftereffects of COVID, as health services attempted to deal with the COVID backlog from an already stretched capacity to deliver.

But despite these pressures, Scotland has continued to outperform England and Wales.

In fact Britain – i.e. most predominantly England – has declined enormously. Here “Britain” is compared to Scotland, as individual national data is not publicly available for England and Wales. This chart shows the Scotland norm, together with the least/most satisfaction in local authorities across Scotland – together with my two local areas.

(click for dynamic chart)

The impact of Westminster

Now imagine if Westminster austerity hadn’t been inflicted on Scotland. Going in to COVID Scotland’s NHS would have continued to receive its pre-2010 levels of investment. We would most probably have seen a consistently high performance level – which was running at almost 90% satisfaction in 2010.

After COVID there would undoubtedly have been a drop – but on this basis it would still be running at around 80% satisfaction. The NHS would be recovering much more quickly.

The only thing that will remove Scotland permanently from the damage of Westminster, and further unnecessary damage to our NHS, is regaining independence.

It’s true that it takes exceptional circumstances – like World Wars – for a majority of votes to count in Westminster. It’s one of the least democratic systems of any state claiming to be a democracy.

(click for dynamic chart)

So, of course, if the UK wants to make any claim to be a “modern” democracy, Westminster needs some radical changes. But there’s a more fundamental issue with UK democracy – the exclusion of all nations from power except England.

Let’s look at the impact of PR on Westminster:

(click for dynamic chart)

Yes, PR would mean that there would be a fairer match between votes cast and party seats won – more voters would no longer see their votes going to waste. This is a good thing. But let’s look at that again from the perspective of where parties are based and where their priorities come from.

Would PR stop other nations being excluded?

Let’s compare how PR affects inclusion of the nations of the UK at Westminster. It will perhaps come as no surprise to reveal that, throughout the entire history of the United Kingdom, there have only ever been England-based parties in power. PR will not change this exclusion.

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Parties based in England – and hence overwhelmingly influenced by English votes – dominate Westminster. In fact its virtually never the case that parties based in England even need votes from any other nation to take power in Westminster. The other nations are literally irrelevant. This is reflected in their complete lack of interest in the priorities of other nations.

For example a majority in Scotland support the same or increased immigration, support regaining independence, and feel only Scottish not British – yet these attitudes were completely absent from the manifestos of all parties based in England in the 2024 Westminster election. This is the norm.

(click for dynamic chart)

What would real modernisation look like?

How could Westminster really be modernised? We only have to look at other states and their successful federal models. Germany, for example, has a Bundesrat (the second chamber) that is devoid of appointed-for-life Lords. Instead, it has delegates from every state in the federation. No state dominates. All have a say. It can initiate legislation; Germany’s government can only bring legislation to the upper chamber once the Bundesrat has reviewed it.

Contrast this with Scotland’s position in the UK: the opinions of its Parliament are regularly ignored by the British Government; consultation is regularly at the last minute (or not at all); and our Government has no power of veto – conversely the British Government can (and does) veto decisions of the Scottish Parliament.

(click for dynamic chart)

If all those pressure groups calling for PR in Westminster really believed in an inclusive UK democracy, they’d be equally pushing for a federal structure across the nations of the UK.

And they’re not.

PR alone in Westminster only benefits England. For the people of Scotland to see their priorities fully reflected in Government would require Scotland once again to become an independent sovereign state.

Every year the “Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland” (GERS) is published. It’s a set of data that purports to explain how healthy Scotland’s finances are. But the trouble is, its based on some pretty misleading assumptions that aren’t made clear. Like “revenues” only including what are called “Scottish” revenues. Despite the title they’re not all the revenues collected from Scotland. Some are called “UK” revenues (collected by the British Government from Scotland) and they’re not included.

Instead of using an assumption-filled and filtered GERS view, I went back to basics. The UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) publishes a comprehensive sets of data. Some of this data concerns public sector finance and taxes across the whole UK. In particular “country and regional public sector finances”, expenditure (what governments spend) and revenues (what governments receive from the public and private sector).

For example the ONS provides data like this:

But more interestingly, we can look at in proportion to the number of people in each nation (“per head”). Let’s try to do that for revenue and expenditure, as the ONS reports it. Unfortunately we hit our first hurdle: it provides no figure for England. Just UK, Wales and Scotland. (And Northern Ireland, which I’m not considering here.)

To get England’s public expenditure and revenues we must take the total and calculate the per-head figure ourselves. Handily, the ONS also provides this data as mid-year population estimates for each nation. Here’s that 2023 figure re-done “per head”, this time including revenue as well.

This is a little more interesting. But it explicitly assumes that Scotland’s Oil and Gas revenues are shared per-head across the UK as part of each nation’s revenue total.

Revenues from Scotland’s Oil & Gas production

What if we took these off England, Wales (and Northern Ireland) and allocated them only to Scotland? This would likely reflect the situation after Scotland regains independence – so it’s a reasonable question to ask.

To do this we need to know what those revenues are. Here the UK’s Office for Budget Responsibility (the OBR) can help with Oil and Gas revenues data to inform us. We can take that data, and the population totals we obtained earlier, and calculate what proportion of public revenues come from Oil and Gas.

Let’s calculate that, remove it from Wales and England, and allocate it all to Scotland. This is the arithmetic for 2023:

We end up with an additional £1.78k per head of revenue in 2023. For Scotland’s population of 5,490,100 this amounts to an additional revenue of about £9bn! Compare this with the DWP’s data for the cost of paying the UK State Pension to everyone in receipt in Scotland (about £246m in 2024/25) and you can see how significant that figure is.

Let’s look at how the results of those calculations change with the data over time.

(Link to dynamic chart)

Revenues from duty on Scotland’s whisky

Another big revenue number that gets distributed across the whole UK is the Alcohol duty from Scottish whisky production. We need to make some more assumptions to estimate this figure - as the UK Government doesn’t directly publish it.

First is the headline figure for all spirits. This comes from the UK HMRC Alcohol Bulletin. So what proportion is down to Scottish whisky. From the Alcohol Bulletin we also have annual production of spirits. We can add up the theoretical maximum production level of all Scotland’s distillieries. Dramface has done the work. But this is measured in pure alcohol volume. Whisky is bottled at typically 63.5% strength - so that increases the production volume. But the distilleries don’t operate at 100% capacity. In fact its more like 77%. So that reduces the production volume.

The impact of this is that Scotch whisky accounts for an estimated 77.8% of total alcohol duty from spirits. Let’s convert that into a per-head figure, take it away from the other nations’ revenues, and allocate it all to Scotland - as I did for Oil and Gas above. Here’s the result. The surplus based on 2023 figures grows to a very respectable £17.6bn.

(Link to dynamic chart)

Now who says Scotland can’t afford to be independent – or that it wouldn’t be able to afford to spend more on key areas like State Pension (currently running at one of the lowers in Europe)?

And there’s more!

And finally – this analysis doesn’t include other areas of Scottish revenues currently considered “UK wide” – like our renewable energy sector.

Frequently asked questions

A few folk have asked me about the above analysis. Here are some answers to the most frequently asked questions.

I can’t find these figures in GERS

This analysis is based on data collected by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS). The same data used by British governments when planning the public finances of the UK. GERS are accredited official statistics prepared by the Scottish Government. GERS uses a range of data sources - including the ONS - and applies a set of assumptions agreed with the British government that have evolved over the years.

Rather than making these same assumptions - many of which are quite political in origin - I decided to start from the base data.

What does this have to do with a Scottish deficit?

There is some debate as to the size of a Scottish deficit after independence. Opinions vary from a national share of the UK Government debt, to zero. It is likely to be a negotiating point in any Separation Agreement following the declaration of independence.

I have made no assumptions about any deficit the independent Scotland might carry. The “independence dividend” I describe here is financed from revenues that would come from Scotland, that, based on current UK Government figures, are currently shared with the rest of the UK.

It is true, however, that an independent Scotland would, as a sovereign state with its own Central Bank, be able to raise debt to fund additional investment. This would increase the dividend substantially.

Let’s not worry why – if they’re billionaires it’ll almost certainly be an angle they’ve spotted for amassing even more money. We can deal with that later. For now let’s focus on the shared prize. After all, we’ll all benefit.

I asked folk what the big spend items should be to ensure they got their way. Have I missed anything? Here’s how it added up. By my reckoning they’d only have to give away £65.5m of their hoard to pretty much guarantee success – so they’d remain a billionaire – but have I missed anything?

My rules are simple:

• “it must be legal” – so that removes any Russian interference or bribery of politicians.

• It must be “honest” – so no “political parties as personal private companies” or hidden donations via secret offshore accounts – the sort of stuff British parties like to do.

My independence budget

My budget comes to £65.5m. For a billionaire intent on giving Scotland independence, that’s easily affordable. Here’s how I’d spend that money.

Command the audience

Biggest item in my budget is a free-to-air Pro-independence TV, YouTube, And Radio News Channels. GB News has successfully shaped right-wing thinking across the UK, and with the lack of any significant Scottish news channels “IndyNews” would do the same for a progressive, pro-independence agenda focussed on Scotland.

Finally, the British media and British public national broadcaster would have something to balance against their constantly negative coverage of our political parties and government. No longer would the biggest strategic topic on Scotland’s agenda – independence – be ignored.

Next on my list would be a free paper like Metro, balancing out the 99% negative coverage fed to us by foreign-owned media such as The Scotsman and Herald. “Indy” would provide topical coverage of Scottish issues – but without the negative, Westminster-oriented, coverage. It would be given away free throughout Scotland and financed with advertising. My budget would allow it to be set up and initially funded until it reached sufficient scale to continue mostly on its own. It would seek to cooperate with other pro-Indy publications such as The National.

Level the political playing field

Next on my list are two equally costly areas of investment: levelling the field in political party funding, and political lobbying.

Currently British parties attract vastly more in donations than Scottish parties - but they still get to field candidates in Scotland. This is for two reasons: firstly because they cover England and Wales as well as Scotland – they’re just larger. Secondly because big business and other groups with an interest in what British governments will decide are only interested in parties that might be in power in Westminster. Scottish parties have never been in power there.

So this means I need to spend big on donations to Scottish parties like The SNP – as well as lobbying in Westminster and Brussels to “smooth the way” towards independence and separation.

And more battle busses. Naturally!

Advertising

There are other ways to make the public more aware of independence and what they may be missing by not supporting it. These include advertising – both physically and online. Areas to cover include ad hoardings and social media advertising, as well as “Led by Donkeys”-style political headline makers.

Finally there’s re-invigorating the grassroots Yes movement. Supporting the movement with central services like social media delivery and better funding for groups like Believe in Scotland – but also paying the fees to ensure high profile figureheads can be employed to be a higher profile public face of the movement.

Together with the better-funded Scottish political parties, initiatives such as constitutional conventions and grass roots social and cultural events become much easier to facilitate when the budget isn’t the issue.

Here’s my full budget summary:

Now we just need the billionaire to step up.

The National

The National started publication in November 2014. It is based in Scotland and its Editor is Laura Webster. It is owned by Newsquest Media Group – which also owns The Herald. The Herald has a separate editorial team. There is no evidence that it exerts any editorial control over The National.

Newsquest is based in England. It currently owns some 205 newspapers and magazines across the UK. It exerts no editorial control over The National and claims “our Editors have complete editorial independence and are free to edit as they see fit and do so in the interests of the individual communities they represent.”

Newsquest’s parent is the US company Gannett – a mass media holding company funded by private equity – and ultimately owned by the UAE Wealth Fund.

The National takes a pro-Holyrood stance aligned to the interests of the Scottish Parliament – including independence. It includes a Unionist Fact-checking and Rebuttal Service. Columnists and contributors include well-known names such as Professor Richard Murphy, Gerry Hassan, Lesley Riddoch, Owen Jones, Kate Forbes, Ruth Wishart, Mhairi Black, Lorna Slater, Ross Greer, and Gordon Macintyre-Kemp.

Bylines Scotland

Bylines Scotland is part of the Bylines Network and was launched in 2022. Bylines Network was founded in 2020 and is based in England. It uses ten brands, each with their own web addresses, to flag regional emphasis in article selection. There is much identical content shared across the brands, but occasional articles are more regionally focussed.

Ownership is in the hands of four England-based directors, two of whom also act as executive editors across the Bylines network brands. Each brand has its own local editor. In the case of research scientist Galsworthy, he is Chair of the European Movement UK and also a member of Scientists for Labour.

Bylines Network claims to be “progressive and internationalist”. Its stated aim is to support citizen journalism by giving a voice to local people. Editorial is Westminster/England focussed, with occasional local content or emphasis. A typical Bylines Scotland article is either entirely focussed on the UK government, or has a small “and in Scotland” addendum. It is mostly Unionist in editorial stance and choice of authors.

Editorial control is more important than ownership

Bylines Scotland claims to “give a voice to local people” but its editorial control is opaque and very much influenced by the owners and founders in England. The National is ultimately owned by a huge Middle East Wealth Fund, but editorial control is clearly in Scotland and aligned to Scottish priorities.

Which do you prefer?

• The experience of other States joining the EU;

• Attitudes to Scotland from those that could impact Scotland’s progress;

• The extent to which Scotland is prepared;

• An assessment of hazards that might de-rail or delay – and what Scotland can do about them;

• The good news about how separation from the UK might actually help accession to the EU; and

• The work that needs to be done, and priorities for Scotland.

All of which is discussed below. As are some of the early benefits. Finally the Eurozone is discussed: deficit and debt, and their relevance to EU membership (tldr; they’re not as relevant as you might think).

Want’s not discussed? Primarily whether Scotland should consider joining the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) before/instead of the EU: This is already considered here – it’s not the magic bullet that some portray it as.

Three phases are considered: Separation; Accession; and at some later stage, the Eurozone.

There’s a lot to cover. To help, the article is broken down like this:

• People before Process

• Relationship and Readiness

  • Scotland’s readiness

  • Why did some countries take so long?

  • Why did some take so little time?

• How long might Scotland’s Accession take?

  • Scotland’s relationships

  • Assessing risks to Scotland’s smooth accession

  • The worst, best and most likely case

• Combining Separation and Accession

• A footnote on the Eurozone

  • Should Scotland even join the Eurozone?

Let’s get started…

People before Process

Before launching into the first phase (Separation from the UK) let’s sort out an important principle. Politics is not a process, or a set of rules: politics is about people. Mistaking politics for process appears to be part of the English culture – and by influence, it affects many in Scotland as well.

Think back to when the UK was part of the EU. France had a reputation in the British media for regularly being reluctant to implement EU directives fully. Sometimes this caused delays or even breaches in how little or how late EU law was transposed into national law. How did the British Government react? It quietly moaned and continued to work hard not to be like the French.

Westminster’s huge and highly experienced civil service worked ceaselessly to help develop EU law. The EU liked the UK – but the UK worked equally hard at implementing those Directives. None of that French “exceptionalism” for them! After all, rules are rules, aren’t they? Of course it’s not just the French. And they’re not the worst offenders:

In reality, as those UK negotiators understood fully – but many politicians didn’t, particularly during Brexit –achieving your national interests requires excellent networking, relationship building, and pragmatism – the people side of rule making.

You’ll see that even the institutions of the EU recognise this truth. Throughout its Accession process you’ll notice references to “negotiation” and “agreement”.

Relationships and Readiness

What is “Accession”? How ready is Scotland to start it? How long have other States taken to complete it?

The EU accession process describes how new states join. It’s common to look at the accession process and assume that it is a mandatory set of rules, followed in the same way by all new members. The EU has produced a handy step-by-step guide. Whilst this is a useful tick list of things to achieve – it is not a proscriptive process. The major steps are:

Once Scotland has declared independence, and this declaration is recognised, it can submit an application to join the EU to the European Council. The Council will form an opinion on whether Scotland’s membership should be considered. If the opinion is positive the existing member states will decide if Scotland should become a candidate for membership. All these areas will be discussed further below.

Once Scotland becomes a candidate for membership the real work begins. In reality each accession process is different in detail. They are individually tailored through negotiation to achieve an agreed “framework” that suites both parties. Having agreed the general detail, the EU will then support Scotland in completing the tasks in its own “accession framework”.

The shape and success of Scotland’s accession will be driven by its relationship with EU institutions, members, and others. It will also critically depend on how ready it is. To see how these impact likely success and speed of accession let’s also consider the experience of previous member states.

Scotland’s Readiness

The EU will consider Scotland’s readiness against “negotiating chapters”. It will agree a plan in each of these areas, where Scotland needs work to align with EU rules and standards. Some of this work will be carried out during accession – it might be agreed that other areas are best left for a later date.

in 1993 at the European Council meeting, member states agreed ‘Copenhagen criteria’. These set additional prerequisites for accession. Scotland would also have to demonstrate compliance in these areas. They are grouped into three strands:

• Political – stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;

• Economic – a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces; and

• Administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis – aligning state law with the accumulated body of EU treaties, laws, decisions, international agreements and judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – and ability to take on the obligations of membership.

In addition it was agreed in the Maastricht Treaty that any European state that respects the principles of the EU may apply to join.

If a state meets these criteria, negotiations can begin around the “Chapters” of alignment. The picture below summarises Scotland’s current alignment with these pre-reqs and Chapters.

Compared to Scotland, if you’re, for example, an Eastern European country freshly independent after being part of the USSR, there’s certainly a lot to do. However, the EU is there to help. It has teams who have done this many times before, with countries starting from many different positions of readiness. It will even help fund the investments required.

The diagram above shows Scotland’s current alignment: where little or no work is required; and work that remains to be carried out. Most areas are green (little or no work required).

For those areas where alignment is still required Scotland will have the opportunity to complete many areas during Separation from the UK. This means that they do not need to be revisited later as part of Scotland’s Accession phase. I’ll discuss this overlap later as part of the overall programme of required work.

From the above table you can see that the Chapters outstanding for Scotland are:

• Fundamentals:

  • Functioning of democratic institutions, specifically confirming our constitution

• Internal market:

  • Financial services

  • Free movement of workers

  • Right to establishment & freedom to provide services

  • Free movement of capital

• Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth:

  • Information society and media

  • Customs union

  • Economic & monetary policy

• Green agenda & sustainable connectivity:

  • Trans-European networks

  • Energy

  • Environment & climate change

• Resources, agriculture & cohesion:

  • Agriculture & rural development

  • Fisheries & aquaculture

  • Regional policy & coordination of structural instruments

• External relations:

  • Foreign, security & defence policy.

Discussion about debt etc. are part of the Eurozone activities addressed separately. Whilst Scotland would need to agree to join the Eurozone, and work towards that, there is no obligation to join until Scotland feels ready. This will be after membership has been completed and is discussed further at the end.

There is a lot of noise coming from some quarters about Green Freeports and Special Economic Zones, with claims that they will stop Scotland joining the EU altogether. They haven’t prevented member states from joining the EU so far. The myths around Green Freeports and the EU are considered in this article.

Its clear that, when it comes to Scotland’s Accession, it is not starting from a blank page. In ALL of the above areas it will be re-establishing what it previously already complied with as part of the UK’s membership of the EU. These include adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy; regaining access to Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund programmes; rejoining the Customs Union; re-establishing Freedom of Movement; and participating in the European security and defence policy and the Common foreign and security policy.

In 2017 Elmar Brok, former Chairman of the EU Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, said that it would be “easy” for an independent Scotland to join the EU because it already fulfils the criteria: “there would not be much to negotiate”. See video below.

Of course the EU has evolved since the UK removed Scotland. Any changes will still need to be captured within Scotland’s accession framework.

Finally in this section, it’s clear that being aligned to the EU helps trade with the EU – whether or not you’re a member (as even Brexiters are increasingly acknowledging). The British government is adopting a slow creep back towards the EU – as seen in the latest Brexit reset. Such efforts will naturally help Scotland in its readiness to rejoin.

Why did some states take so long?

Looking at how long it has taken existing members, it’s clear that accession processes have varied enormously:

Why did some states take so long to join the EU once they’d submitted their requests? Could the same reasons conceivably apply to Scotland? Looking at the top five shown above its clear that they all had their own unique reasons for these timescales. (None are applicable to Scotland.)

Cypress – 14 years – “the Cyprus problem”

Cyprus currently holds the record for longest ever accession process at a little under 14 years. You can see from the above that most of the delay was in the early stages – prior to the start of actual accession negotiations. The main reason for this was both parties trying to find a way to address the division resulting from the Cyprus problem. There is no comparable political issue in Scotland.

Malta – 14 years – political division

What about Malta? It took just about as long. Here the issue was getting the European Commission to offer an opinion in principle about Malta’s request to join. Malta’s request to join the then EEC was at the instigation of the centre-right, pro-European, Nationalist Party. Unfortunately before the EEC agreed to move forward, the Labour Party came to power and decided to freeze the pre-membership phase. Some years later the Nationalist Party came to power again and restarted the process. No wonder it took so long!

Romania – 11 years – state fundamentals

Romania was not prepared for EU membership. It experienced significant obstacles in areas of corruption, the judiciary, and even the rule of law. Even though it was still allowed to join, the EU considered that these areas remained an issue. To address this the EU Cooperation and Verification Mechanism was created to ensure ultimate compliance. These historic issues are clearly not applicable to Scotland.

Ireland – 11 years – the Troubles

Ireland experienced a huge delay in waiting for the European Commission to give its blessing for a membership application. In fact, it wasn’t until General de Gaulle’s eventual resignation that the then-EC was able to progress enlargement again. At this time Britain was also applying for membership. With fraught Anglo-Irish relations and the worst phase of the Northern Ireland Troubles there was further reluctance to move Ireland’s request along. Again, these are Ireland-specific issues that would not apply to Scotland.

Denmark – 11 years – lack of popular support

Despite being a member, Denmark has even yet not fully embraced the EU. It negotiated opt-outs from the Euro, defence, and justice and home affairs areas following its rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. When it applied for EU membership it was a member of the EFTA – however this involved neither agricultural nor fisheries, which were of prime importance to Denmark. Denmark was split on EU membership and was also discussing a Scandinavian union. After a referendum and further negotiations across Scandinavia and with the EU, Denmark and the EU agreed to move forward with its application.

Denmark’s delays were specific to its economy, its place within Scandinavia, and relative division about EU membership. These factors are not relevant to Scotland.

Why did some take so little time?

Across all states who have joined the EU the median (midpoint) in timescales for accession is about seven years. Some states have achieved membership from initial application in around five years – or significantly less. How did they achieve this? Looking at those states that were quickest to join, their experiences may have relevance to Scotland.

In particular the UK’s opt-out from the Schengen area is likely to be something that Scotland would also seek to negotiate, and for the same reason – a desire to remain part of the Ireland/Britain Common Travel Area (CTA). The CTA pre-dates the EU and provides a similar borderless area, but only within the islands of Ireland and Britain.

In the case of Sweden and Finland, part of the reason for their swift membership process was the nature of their modern democracies and the strong support for the EU within their societies – both areas that Scotland can replicate.

Greece – 5 years – EU politics

Greece had an interesting accession journey. When it requested membership the European Commission proposed, among other things, a ten year pre-accession period. This reflected its understanding of the Greek position as recently democratised, economically weak and politically volatile. For the first time in its history, the Council of Ministers unanimously overruled the Commission’s view. The view at the time was that this was due to a combination of idealism and a keenness to advance democracy in Greece. Irrespective, history showed that Greece was not really ready. However for these political reasons, the EU supported fast accession.

There is no suggestion currently that the EU would waive its assessment of Scotland’s alignment in the same way, and simply allow it to join unprepared.

Austria – 5 years – popular support

Austria took about five years to join the EU. Austria's relatively swift entry was considered to be a result of highly successful negotiations and a strong public vote in a referendum. Austria simply really wanted to join, and had no difficult obstacles. It sought adoption of the Euro as quickly as possible and even took austerity measures to rapidly meet Eurozone criteria.

It is conceivable that Scotland may well reflect Austria’s enthusiasm and readiness to align. Scotland might not reflect the same enthusiasm for the Euro adoption – but that would not slow down EU membership.

The UK – 4 years – prior experience

The UK only took four years. But it was the third attempt. The first two attempts were veto’d by France but eventually re-started in 1970. By this time concerns about the Commonwealth and UK trade terms had been largely resolved. Also, by this stage the UK was already a member of the EFTA. There were some serious issues still to be resolved: particularly around Britain’s financial contribution, the Common Agricultural Policy, and participation in the Schengen Area. If it hadn’t been for these the UK’s entry would have been even faster.

Sweden and Finland – 3 years – preparation, fit, and popular support

Sweden and Finland both took about three years from initial request to being accepted as official member. Both were already EFTA members and had no issues on the scale of the UK’s that required negotiation with the EU. Both had modern functioning democracies and societies that were strongly pro-EU.

How long might Scotland’s Accession take?

This section attempts to assess the worst, best and most likely timescales for Scotland’s accession.

To do this it considers how long Scotland’s accession might take, based on the experiences of other states as described in the previous section; how supportive (or not) others might be; and what are the risks of delay can be identified.

If we remove the states that:

- Took a long time over accession due to reasons specific to their situation – i.e. reasons not applicable to Scotland;

- Were already in the EFTA and party to the EEA – and hence already highly aligned to EU rules and standards;

- Were totally misaligned to EU fundamentals, such as those newly independent states emerging from the USSR; and

- Had been sovereign states for some time prior to their application;

then we end up with states that more reflect how Scotland will find itself after regaining independence. These include Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Austria. This how they compare:

In general the lesson we can learn from the accession of these representative countries is that:

• if you’re already well aligned to EU fundamentals – or require little transition;

• are able to negotiate effectively (even if you do have any significant exceptions);

• your citizens strongly support membership; and

• if existing members states do not raise big concerns through the process;

then it is perfectly possible to become a member in eight years or less. However…

Scotland is already well aligned. It would also sensibly carry out some alignment activities as part of the early Separation transition away from the UK. For these reasons we can reduce that timescale, and this point will be covered in more detail later.

Now let’s look at the attitudes of others to Scotland’s membership, then things specific to Scotland that might impact speed and ease of Accession. How might considerations from any of these areas shorten or lengthen that timescale?

Scotland’s relationships

Let’s look at that “member concerns” thing a little more. It can result in outright veto (as France did to the UK’s application, twice). It can delay accession negotiations significantly (as Slovenia did with Croatia; the UK with Portugal and Spain over fishing rights; and as Greece did with Cyprus). This is why the stakeholders in Scotland’s membership need to be securely on-side. And this means more than just the member states – although they have a strong voice.

Incidentally, some folk still worry about Spain’s attitude to Scottish independence in the context of its own devolved regions, such as Catalonia. Spain has made it clear on a number of occasions as reported here and here that it would not object to any legally independent Scotland from joining the EU.

Who are the stakeholders for Scotland’s EU membership and how are they feeling about us? Will they support or oppose these negotiations. How strong is their voice anyway?

The supporters

It’s clear that, in the groups that matter, there will be general support for Scotland’s membership of the EU: and why wouldn’t there be?

Scotland has a modern progressive society – a large majority of which support joining the EU; it has one of the best educated workforces in Europe; and fantastic natural resources, including some of the best renewable energy. Scotland is similar in many ways to a Scandinavian country.

Since 2016 the Scottish Government has been working hard to build European relationships and reenforce how much more popular the EU is here compared with England. Some senior European figures have openly stated that Brexit has altered European attitudes to Scotland and Scottish independence.

The Scottish Parliament actively participates in Nordic Council meetings and events – and, of course, Scotland successfully hosted the COP26 climate conference.

And of course, for centuries before the UK was formed, Scotland and the rest of Europe had been historically close. One of the first mutual defence treaties was the Auld Alliance between France and Scotland against England.

Scottish businesses are another stakeholder group that, with very few exceptions, would like to see Scotland back in the EU. According to the British ONS, small businesses in Scotland provide 1.2m jobs – that’s 56% of all private sector employment – a much higher proportion than in England. 85% of those were exporting to the EU before Brexit. But the ONS reports that 82% of these business have suffered because of reductions in EU worker numbers and exports have dropped.

Opposers

It is reasonable to assume that the British government will be neutral or oppose Scotland’s entry into the EU. Scotland may be seen as an unwanted close-by rival: it is likely to attract workers from England if progressive government policies are extended; businesses may also be attracted by the benefits of setting up in Scotland, in a language and culture that they are familiar with, and gaining frictionless access to the Single Market.

With British parties moving increasingly right, a future British government may oppose Scotland’s entry into the EU on purely ideological grounds.

Assessing risks to Scotland’s smooth accession

When there are lots of uncertain areas of varying scale and likelihood it useful to carry out a risk assessment. This is a tried and tested method that involves:

• Identifying likely hazards;

• Evaluating how likely they are to occur – and how serious the impact would be if they did;

• Finding ways to control, minimise, or remove (i.e. mitigate) the hazard;

• Seeing how much of a threat the hazard remains.

We can prioritise hazards: the most important are those with a high impact, and a high likelihood of occurring. Least important are hazards with a low likelihood of occurring, irrespective of their impact.

Think about the hazard of a plane landing on your house – huge impact, but thankfully a very low likelihood. This would be treated as a very low priority. In fact we might sensibly ignore it altogether.

Once we’ve done all that we can look across all the “mitigated hazards” and see how much of an issue remains.

Notes

Priority: this is based on a combination of Impact and Likelihood

(1) Scotland was in the EU for 47 years. Divergence is relatively small and well understood.

(2) Scotland already has many of the required institutions, regulatory bodies, and laws and can readily expand the scope of these.

(3) The Schengen Agreement was created in 1985, and came into effect I 1995, providing passport-free travel between member states, a common approach to visas, and sharing of security information via the Schengen information system. The UK and Ireland opted out and continue the earlier Common Travel Area (CTA). The CTA was decided as part of the formation of the “Irish Free State” in 1922.

Some EU states joined the EU but did not join Schengen for some time – e.g. Croatia joined in 2013 but wasn’t admitted to Schengen until 2023. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007 and weren’t admitted until 2025. Cyprus is still not a member due to ongoing division of the island, particularly the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Thus a number of states have either opted out of Schengen, or not immediately joined as part of EU Accession.

In the best case the UK and Ireland would accept Scotland’s continued presence within the CTA; and the EU would accept an opt-out from Schengen. In the worst case Scotland would join Schengen and enjoy frictionless, passport-free travel to other EU members, but would need to control the border with the continuing UK. This control may be electronic (as with Great Britain/Northern Ireland) or physical (as currently occurs with the UK/EU). In neither case would Scotland’s EU Accession be at risk, but there may be negotiating delays depending on the other parties’ attitudes to this area.

(4) Support for joining the EU in Scotland has grown from 62% in 2016 to 75% in 2025. Whilst this risk would have a high impact if it were to be realised, the probability of this happening is very low.

The worst, best and most likely case

Weighing up the risks, attitudes to Scotland, the experience of other states, and Scotland’s readiness: what’s the worst, most likely, and best case for how Scotland’s accession timescales?

Worst case

From the risk assessment above, let’s assume that all possible hazards are encountered and their mitigation causes delays:

• The British Government proves a blocker on political grounds; unreasonable demands from either Government cannot quickly be agreed. Whilst Scotland may still be accepted as a potential member state by the EU, the EU will be unwilling (most likely unable) to start accession negotiations until the Scotland/UK Separation Agreement is agreed in principle;

• Scotland’s exceptions prove time consuming to negotiate – like opt out from Schengen so it can continue to participate in the Common Travel Area;

• A Referendum on EU entry is required prior to the Scottish Government completing Accession activities; and

• Delays in setting up the institutions of State.

Best case

In the best case:

• none of the possible hazards noted are encountered;

• the EU Council, Parliament, and member States welcome, encourage and fully support Scotland’s membership; and

• Scotland’s alignment to EU rules and standards is found to be high.

Most likely case

The most likely case falls between the worst and best cases. It suggests Scotland’s Accession can complete in about six years. The timelines of each scenario can be compared like this:

Combining Separation and Accession

In the previous section we discussed Scotland’s Accession. In reality the stages of Separation (from the UK) and Accession (to the EU) would overlap. As we’ll discover, an intelligent approach to Separation can both help Scotland become an independent Sovereign state and help to align Scotland with EU rules and standards. In fact taking this intelligent approach to Separation benefits Scotland irrespective of whether or not it subsequently becomes an EU member.

Let’s look at how these two stages might reasonably fit together, and how this shortens timescales significantly. The picture below shows the “Chapters” (areas) of alignment that the EU defines, colour coded by those where Scotland is already largely aligned; ones that could be sensibly carried out during the Separation stage; and ones that will need to wait for the Accession stage.

The outstanding Chapters split between Separation and Accession phases like this:

Separation Transition priorities

• Functioning of democratic institutions, specifically confirming our constitution

• Financial services

• Information society and media

• Economic & monetary policy

• Energy

• Environment & climate change.

Additional EU Accession priorities

• Free movement of workers

• Right to establishment & freedom to provide services

• Free movement of capital

• Customs union

• Trans-European networks

• Agriculture & rural development

• Fisheries & aquaculture

• Regional policy & coordination of structural instruments

• Foreign, security & defence policy.

When Scotland regains independence it will immediately start to negotiate separation with the continuing UK and sets up the missing functions needed for a sovereign state – like its own currency. At some point shortly afterwards it will lodge a request to join the EU with the European Commission. What then?

Many transition activities during the Separation phase would be sensibly completed in line with EU rules and standards: doing this reduces timescales for the EU Accession phase. The timetable for establishment of a new Scottish currency has been considered in some detail by the Scottish Currency Group.

Once it is clear what the terms of accession are, a Referendum may be considered necessary.

Let’s consider an approach where it is assumed that Scotland would feel comfortable submitting a request for membership at an early point after the Declaration of Independence – e.g. once the British Government had engaged in material separation negotiations and Scotland’s direction of travel was clear to the international community.

Irrespective of when the request is made to the European Commission, Scotland and the EU are likely to want to delay starting the Alignment discussions until the Scotland/UK Separation Agreement has been signed. Otherwise there may still be confusion over what work still needs to be included within the scope of the framework.

Finally it is assumed that, irrespective of how swiftly the Alignment activities complete, the EU/Scotland Accession Treaty will not be signed until the Scotland/UK transition activities are complete.

The picture below shows a potential plan of work, based on the above assumptions and a “most likely case” scenario.

A further phase encompassing membership of the Eurozone is also included. This would happen only after Scotland has become an EU member. Membership of the Eurozone is discussed at the end of the article.

You can see from this plan that Scotland’s membership of the EU might well be achievable within seven years of declaring independence.

Early benefits

During this plan period many of the early transition and alignment activities will bring immediate and tangible benefits to Scotland. For example:

• Our own public broadcaster and media regulator, replacing the British equivalents we currently pay towards, but over which we have no control;

• The ability to start investing at scale in Scotland, based on our social and economic priorities;

• Creation of an energy strategy based to deliver benefit to Scotland – no longer a net exporter with the highest consumer pricing in Europe;

• New direct ferry routes to mainland Europe, as Ireland has done – stimulating businesses as they again access to the Single Market once again;

• Elections to choose Scotland’s representatives for the European Parliament, giving influence and access to EU organisations; and

• Regaining access to the EU Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund programmes to replace the much smaller British government Brexit “levelling up” funds.

A footnote on the Eurozone

Eurozone activities will be addressed separately to accession. Whilst Scotland would need to agree to join the Eurozone at some point, there is no obligation to join until Scotland feels ready. It also requires all existing members to agree that Scotland was ready.

This will happen after membership has been completed.

Membership is conditional the Council of the EU agreeing. As a minimum it will expect that Scotland has met the Eurozone Convergence criteria, and a qualified majority of Eurozone member states recommend that Scotland is ready to join. We asses Scotland’s Convergence criteria readiness below.

Sweden and Denmark have still not adopted the Euro more than 26 years after the Eurozone started in 1999. Like the UK when it was a member, they both negotiated opt-outs as existing members when the Eurozone was created.

The other countries that have not adopted the Euro have failed to do so because they do not yet feel ready.

Scotland’s Convergence readiness

States wishing to join the Eurozone must meet four Convergence criteria defined in the Masstricht Treaty. The table below summarises these criteria, together with Scotland’s current state of readiness.

Let’s look at each convergence criteria in more detail – including how EU members and existing Eurozone members are performing.

Price stability

The measure used is that inflation (CPI) is not more than 1.5% above the rate of the three best performing Member States. Scotland’s current CPI is 0.6% higher than this. Note, however, that Scotland’s current CPI is lower than four existing Eurozone members!

Public finances

The measure used is that annual government deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP, and that Government debt must not exceed 60% of GDP. Currently the Eurozone average exceeds both these measures.

Scotland’s deficit is disputed. Unionists point to the Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland report (GERS), which reported the 2023/4 deficit as a staggering 10.4% compared the UK average of 3.5%. GERS does not account for significant revenues collected in Scotland that are not classified as Scottish and are only accounted for at a UK level. For this reason the UK average is taken here – although in reality I would expect an independent Scotland to enjoy a lower than UK average deficit. Scotland would fully recognise all revenues generated in Scotland. It also expected to reform its Energy sector to rebalance benefit between the state and the private energy companies.

Scotland’s debt position is unusual. Whilst the UK debt to GDP ratio is currently 94.8% - well above the Convergence criteria measure of 60% maximum – this is UK debt. Only sovereign states can create money (debt) to fund investment. Scotland is not currently a sovereign state and has no reserve bank. It cannot hold debt until this changes – i.e. until independence.

Of course Scotland may agree to accept some of the UK debt burden as part of separation negotiations. Sensibly it would not agree to anything more than the Eurozone 60% of GDP maximum – preferably much less.

Durability of convergence

The measure of financial durability used by the Eurozone is long-term interest rate. Scotland does not yet have a Reserve Bank and so it has no long-term interest rate to evidence. This will be established after independence, as this capability is established during the Transition activities. For this purpose the UK is shown.

All Eurozone members easily achieve long-term interest rates that are well within the Convergence criteria. There is no reason to assume Scotland would not be able to achieve the same.

Exchange rate stability

The Convergence criteria in this area is participation is the EU’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) for at least 2 years without severe tensions, in particular without devaluing against the euro. The ERM ensures exchange rate fluctuations between the euro and other EU currencies do not disrupt economic stability within the single market.

This criteria cannot be measured currently as Scotland cannot choose to join the CRM until it is an EU member. Whilst the UK opted out of the Eurozone, it was a member of the original ERM for two years. However it was forced to leave on “Black Wednesday” when the British government failed to stop the pound dropping excessively in value against the Euro.

Should Scotland even join the Eurozone?

Whilst it’s a mandatory requirement of EU membership, some countries who were already members when the Eurozone came along negotiated an opt-out. Should Scotland consider the delays of trying to negotiate one for itself – assuming this was even feasible?

It’s fair to say that Greece’s financial crisis was sever – much based on its recent economic history, and the objectives of its perhaps overly ambitious left wing government at the time. The result was a briefly lived ex-Greek finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, who fell out deeply with the Eurozone, of which Greece was a member. Varoufakis is now a highly vocal and engaging critic – and many adher to his views, as evidenced by this anonymous article published on the Scotonomics site.

A more balanced summary of the pros – and cons – of Eurozone membership can be found in Andrew Beattie’s article for Investopedia. Two points are worth noting when you read both these articles – as I outline here, it would be man years (likely more than a decade) before Scotland could even consider Eurozone membership; and Eurozone membership only occurs when EU states feel that they are now ready. The other consideration is to look to the experience of EU members in the Eurozone, other than Greece. Greece in many ways is not comparable to Scotland’s position. Better comparisons could be made with, for example, Portugal or Austria. But that’s perhaps best left for another article!

My conclusion? With Norway and Iceland moving ever closer to EU membership anyway, the EFTA’s future is questionable. Scotland should bite the bullet and ignore this distraction. EU membership is the only route back to the centre of Europe that makes sense for us.

My top concerns about the EFTA first, then EU membership

• The EFTA’s questionable future.

• The EFTA membership doesn’t mean automatic EEA access, nor automatic access to the EFTA’s FTAs.

• EEA Agreement has many of the same complex and time consuming requirements as EU accession, but without the EU support.

• Its harder to keep momentum for EU membership if in we’re in the EFTA (Norway’s experience).

• We’d still need a Separation Agreement with the UK through either route. Better to negotiate, and any longer term relationship, with EU support as part of the Accession process.

We know what the EU is – but what’s the EFTA?

The EFTA is the European Free Trade Association. Currently it has only four members: Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Previous members Iceland, Finland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden – and the UK – left to join the EU.

It manages the European Economic Area (EEA) which brings together most of the EU countries with the EFTA members (not Switzerland) under an Agreement with the European Commission. The EFTA negotiates its own free trade agreements. The EFTA is governed by a Council which has ambassador-level representatives from each state. There is no Parliament although it does have an Advisory Body with MPs from each state.

The EFTA Advisory Body – MPs from member countries

The main material difference between the EFTA and EU is the EU’s political integration – and the fact that the EFTA is a rule taker from the EU dependent entirely on the EU to listen to any concerns it may have (but no obligation to respect them). In fact the EFTA states have no members of the European Parliament, and no representation in the EU Council. All it can do is act like the UK does currently – and ask to be heard just like any third party with a free trade agreement with the EU might be.

Actually that’s a little harsh. There is a closer relationship between the EFTA and the EU than between the UK and the EU – but only via the EU’s governance of EEA where the EFTA advice may be sought where relevant.

Incidentally, in this respect Labour’s direction of travel on EU relations for the British government is towards the EFTA rather than EU membership. Although whether the EFTA would welcome such a large country dominating its organisation is a different discussion.

Does the EFTA have a future?

Given that so many countries have used the EFTA as a stepping stone to full EU membership; so few countries are still members of the EFTA; and that the EEA exists to bring those members closer to the EU – why don’t the remaining members just join the EU as well? There are two areas of concern currently stopping them joining the EU:

Fishing

Norway has held referendums increasingly in favour of EU membership in 1972 and then in 1994, but rejected membership each time. Currently 63% want another referendum. The 52% “No” vote in 1994 was mostly due to concerns about foreign influence, and control of fishing resources. Interestingly, it was claimed at the time that “the fact that Norway had already signed the EEA agreement made it easier for people to vote No because they knew that Norway had assured EU market access”.

Iceland hasn’t held a referendum on EU membership but it’s new coalition government has agreed to do so in 2027. To date the primary concern about membership has been, once again, the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Fishing is a significant part of the economy for both Iceland and Norway.

Scotland’s fisheries came under the EU’s CFP until we were forced out of the EU by Brexit. Whilst many fishers at the time were pro-Brexit, this is not so much the case now. In any case the fishing industry has dwindled thanks to lack of promised investment from the British Government and currently forms only 0.2% of our economy.

Tax havens

Liechtenstein has a Customs Union with neighbour Switzerland as well as being in the EFTA and participating in the Schengen Area. The main reason it doesn’t want to join is because, as a tax haven in the centre of Europe, it has a desire to maintain sole control of its banking and tax regimes. Much the same reason could be given for Switzerland remaining outside the EU – as well as its claims to “neutrality”.

It looks like Switzerland and Lichenstein will remain the outliers as all routes lead to the EU. The future of the EFTA under these circumstances seems somewhat questionable. Scotland has no plans to turn itself into a tax haven: this reason for being in the EFTA does not apply.

What value does the EFTA have to Scotland?

None of the current EFTA members have reasons for avoiding EU membership that would apply to Scotland. Are there other reasons that Scotland might want to avoid the EU but not the EFTA?

Avoiding the currency debate

When a state joins the EU it must agree to eventually adopt the Euro – when the time is right. This last point is important – some countries have been members for many years – as long as 52 years – and are still not using the Euro (and of course the UK, when it was a member, never did).

Even some members who have adopted the Euro took a long time to feel the time was right – Latvia, for example, took 10 years to place it in circulation.

No state adopts the Euro as soon as it joins the EU. All states adopt it only when they are ready to. Scotland would not be rushed into adopting it until it was ready – and this could be a long time. Certainly it wouldn’t be a consideration as Scotland sets up its new currency on separation from the UK.

Simplifying the exit from the UK

There is an argument put forward by the Scottish Sovereignty Research Group (which favours the EFTA route) that immediately starting Accession process with the EU would weaken Scotland’s position to negotiate a separation agreement with the UK. The argument goes that Scotland would not be able to trade unless it was an EU member and would be very reliant on continuing trade with the continuing UK.

Proposing the EFTA as an interim step whilst completing the EU accession process helps to mitigate this risk but assumes that EFTA membership could be achieved very quickly and that EU membership would take a lot longer than recently joined states took.

All those states had never been EU members before. They were a long way from Acquis (being able to comply with EU rules); most required significant work on their basic political infrastructure; all came from fragmenting multi-national states. Some even had freeports! And yet we’re to assume the worst – that Scotland will take much longer?

For example, those who dislike the EU (or just The SNP) often mention Green Freeports. This is a continuing myth I discuss in more detail in this article. In fact, some states have recently joined the EU have been granted exemption to grandfather-in their Freeports – and the EU has numerous existing exemptions.

The EU’s perspective on Scotland joining the EFTA

Much is made that joining the EFTA “simply requires unanimity from the four existing members” and can be completed in “months if not weeks” – and that this would therefore make the Single Market immediately available to Scotland.

But of course this is naïve nonsense. Look at the EU’s perspective. Does anyone seriously expect the EU to instantly agree to starting imports from a third country with which it has no previous direct relationship, no evidence that its rules and standards have been implemented, and no process for governance of that trade route? Avoiding all that negotiation and transition “through the back door” of the EEA would simply not happen.

Membership of EFTA does not equal participation in the EEA

Joining the EFTA could be very quick – the four members simply need to agree. But participation in the EEA (which is where any real benefit to Scotland comes from) is a completely different matter. New members of the EFTA are not automatically party to the EEA Agreement.

According to Article 128 of the EEA Agreement, “any European State becoming a member of the Community shall, and the Swiss Confederation or any European State becoming a member of the EFTA may, apply to become a party to this Agreement. It shall address its application to the EEA Council.”

The EEA Council takes political decisions leading to the amendment of the EEA Agreement, including the possible enlargement of the EEA. Decisions of the EEA Council are taken by consensus between all EU Member States on the one side and the three EEA EFTA States – Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway – on the other.

What’s more Scotland would not get automatic access to all the EFTA’s existing free trade agreements. It would be obliged to apply – but under Article 56 of the EFTA Convention it is up to each of the third countries who are part of those agreements to negotiate and agree Scotland’s inclusion.

The EFTA is not a magic bullet

Joining the EFTA is not the same as being party to the EEA: the first is likely to be quick and relatively easy; the second much more complex and time consuming. Many of the challenges would be the same ones Scotland would face during the EU accession process. Agreeing the EFTA Convention would not remove obligations for Scotland to transition to EU rules so that it could agree the EEA Agreement.

Whilst it is likely to be quicker to join the EFTA than full membership of the EU, gaining access to the EEA and its benefits will take much longer than the “2-3 months” that some claim. Key to a smooth exit from the UK is the Separation Agreement that Scotland and the UK reach. This will define relationships until a longer-term trade and co-operation agreement is achieved, alongside any relationship that may be defined via Scotland’s membership of the EU.

So what’s the reality behind this Labour PR – and what might it mean for Scotland – where ScotRail and The Caledonian Sleeper are already publicly owned and run by the Scottish Government?

The picture above shows how it all fits together. But it was all started some years ago by the previous Tory Westminster Government, and their Williams-Shapps Plan for Rail. The current Labour Government is simply continuing the implementation of this plan.

What is “GBR”

GBR adds another layer of Westminster bureacracy to existing publicly run passenger train operators, like South Eastern – as well as the publicly run organisation responsible for network infrastructure (Network Rail).

It brings the current English franchised passenger train operators, like East Midlands, into public ownership – as their franchises expire. It will be some years before the “transition” to GBR will be complete.

So lots of scope for spending money on consultants likes Deloittes to “brand” this new collection of public services – integrate it all into one ticketing system etc. In fact by March 2024 some £64m had already been spent on this “transition” by the GBR Transition Team.

Given the relatively small amount that private franchised passenger operators hand out as dividends, it will be interesting to see if the money saved by taking them public will exceed the cost of transition and new admin.

What isn’t in GBR?

The largest part of a passenger operators costs are the rolling stock it uses – buying new and maintaining old. All of this cost is subcontracted via leases to highly profitable rolling stock companies. And this won’t change with the introduction of GBR. The publicly owned GBR will continue to buy in privatised rolling stock capability.

And privately owned freight operators are also out of scope for GBR. So businesses dependent on trains to move their goods will not benefit. A missed opportunity to encourage the move from road to rail.

And what about Scotland

The SNP-run Scottish Government has already taken private franchised passenger train operators into public ownership. ScotRail and The Caledonian Sleeper are managed by Transport Scotland. The Scottish Parliament has confirmed its understanding that there will be no change to the Scottish setup – if anything, the Westminster Bill introducing GBR strenthens the Scottish Government position.

But these services are still dependent on Westminster-run Network Rail for access to rail infrastructure. Other than the branding, this won’t change.

What’s really questionable is how the Scottish Government must find rail infrastructure investment itself – from the limited general investment budget that Westminster allows Scotland. Unlike Westminster, the Scottish Government can’t create money for investment. It has no control over the size of its budget. This means that projects that are a real priority for Scotland – like dual railing the northern track – are challenging to fund. GBR changes none of this.

What’s happened since the launch?

Labour is not proactively nationalising passenger rail operators in England. It is waiting for each franchise to eventually come to a natural end. This has just happened to the first franchise.

Labour calls this a “new dawn” but, as I outline above, three passenger operators in England were already nationalised. A new, new dawn? Unfortunately not: the very first renationalised service involved a rail replacement bus because of engineering works. Engineering works being carried out by that other Great British Railways organisation: Network Rail.

Meanwhile in Scotland, where passenger operating companies have been privatised for some years, The SNP run Scottish Government has been experimenting with removal of peak time fairs. This proved such a success that ScotRails trial has become permanent.

In other good news its become clear that, even with “Great British” Railways, passenger rail services are most reliable in Scotland.

So far so good. But when you start talking about politics not geography things start to become concerning. Mention the “British nation” or “Great British” anything and to many – particularly in Scotland and Wales – you appear to be ignoring the political make-up of Great Britain and forcing the majority English identity on the other nations.

You probably do this without thinking – after all, a large majority live in England. Doing this ignores the minority who don’t live in England. And if you’re one of that minority I can confirm that you do think about this.

Would you prefer to be inclusive and recognise all the nations in Great Britain, and the way people in them feel differently about identity – or exclusive and just think about England?

Why does this happen? Its not just a lack of awareness, although that’s often the case. It’s happened as a result of the basic political structure of the UK.

The British Parliament at Westminster is based entirely on exclusivity – First Past the Post for electing its MPs ensures most voters aren’t represented in Government, and a simple majority of MPs ensures one governing party takes power – decided by the MPs from England.

The parties that have taken turns at power throughout the UK’s history (Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats) clearly like this system. However it leads to a reliance on England, and what pleases English voters. Conversely it leads to the Governments of the other nations frequently being ignored.

(click for detail)

When an all-GB “British” party talks about the “British nation” it is lazily (but perhaps deliberately) reinforcing the status quo. To do anything else would require them to acknowledge the minorities – Scotland and Wales – and their lack of a voice.

Of course people in England are well served by the “British” Parliament, and are mostly happy to call themselves “British”. A majority in Scotland and Wales are not. What’s more, like any unrepresented minority, using the words of the majority simply feels exclusionary.

What to do?

If you are one of the majority who believes that a progressive, inclusive, society is better than one that ignores and excludes minorities, then you should be concerned. Every time you use “British” think about whether you might be more accurate using “English” or “England”. If you’re referencing something or someone in Scotland or Wales, give Scotland and Wales their identity.

The “UK-EU Summit - Common Understanding” is packed full of such politician-speak. It promises “frameworks for dialogue”, the hope that the UK and EU will “seek to enhance cooperation” – and that they “should” work “towards” lots of exciting-sounding things. The UK and EU agree that they “recognise the value” of things they already do, or think might be a good idea – and they want to “continue their exchanges” in other areas.

So what does it cover, and what does it “agree” – in plain English? If all you’ve read is British media headlines, you’ll be in for a surprise. It’s mostly a mixture of:

• UK – just implement the Brexit agreement!

• UK – cooperate better with the EU!

• Let’s both still think about doing the things we both said we should!

It’s only a slight weakening of the UK’s hard Brexit – some EU rule taking, but definitely no talk of re-joining the Single Market or re-establishing Freedom of Movement.

Here’s what was agreed, area by area. This was in return for the UK giving the EU “full access to waters to fish until 30 June 2038”. 60% of the UK total offshore fishing catch is in Scottish waters. As no British media pointed out, the British Government refused all efforts by the Scottish Government to consult on this giveaway in advance. So much for the promised closer cooperation and a reset to relations across the UK!

And there we have it. 3,400 words of waffle condensed down to less than 750 - and still with very little real content. Progress?